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Underlying this work is the idea that there is a problem of strategic complementarity of individuals 
who choose to evade. Complementarity  results from the discretionary policies of governments and 
the strategic implications of the Studi di Settore (Sector Studies), the mechanism used in Italy to 
evaluate the income (in reality, the turnover) of  professional categories and small firms. In the 
Italian case, policy discretion and the Sector Studies lead to a failure of the coordination mechanism 
of taxpayers and confer a strong advantage for the coordination mechanism of tax evaders. The 
outcome is a coordination failure where individuals converge to the least efficient equilibrium from 
a social perspective.  
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1.  Introduction    
 
The size of tax evasion in Italy (the non-reported Value Added Tax base is about 250 billion euro 
per  year)  shows  that  individualistic  models  based  on  maximizing  utility  functions,  used  to 
investigate this phenomenon, are limited in their effectiveness. Traditional tax compliance models 
always assume that agents face choices independently.  However, the assumption of independency 
cannot explain the massive tax evasion in Italy. The reason is that the current tax mechanism, Sector 
Studies, becomes a coordination tool for the players to evade taxes. 
Sample surveys and other empirical analyses reveal an adaptive behavior of individuals on tax 
evasion: an individual tends to evade if he/she is convinced that other taxpayers evade. Behaviors 
that tend to be “self-fulfilling” create dangerous and widespread expectations that are difficult to 
eradicate. This situation triggers a vicious circle where evasion is perceived as a mass phenomenon 
which, in turn, leads the individual to commit tax fraud.
3 In this paper we show that widespread tax 
avoidance is due to the discretion of the government to manage and control the tax system and the 
mechanism (Sector Studies - “Studi di Settore”) in place to estimate the taxable income of small 
firms, the self-employed and professionals.                                
In the Italian case, discretion and the audit process lead to a failure of the mechanism of taxpayer 
coordination and give a major advantage to the mechanism of tax evader coordination. The outcome 
is a “coordination failure” where individuals converge to the least efficient equilibrium from a 
social perspective. 
The Sector Studies, introduced in Italy in 1998, represents an audit selection mechanism to detect 
firms  and  the  self-employed  most  likely  to  evade.  Three  main  characteristics  make  this  fiscal 
instrument  a  valid  coordinator  for  the  individuals  involved  (here:  small  firms,  self-employed, 
professionals), who have been made homogeneous through a process of grouping (cluster analysis). 
First, an endogenous conducted threshold: firms can be audited when the reported turnover is lower 
than its presumed level.
4 Second, the presumed turnover, in turn, depends partly on a set of relevant 
variables as reported by the firm and partly on the features of the economic sector to which the firm 
belongs. These variables and the turnover threshold are known to individuals who must calculate 
their turnover by using special software (Gerico). Third, representatives of firms and professions 
                                                
3 Hearing of the Deputy Minister Vincenzo Visco in the Tax Policy School of the Finance Police, held in 2006. See 
Visco (2006). 
4 The parameters of each economic sector to which the firm belongs, are built in the scheme by estimating parameters 
defining the average (normal) behavior of the firms of the same sector. The economic parameters and hence their 
distance from the threshold, are compared with average parameters which reflect supposed normal behaviour of these 
economic subjects.    
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who are subject to imputed income of the Sector Studies are closely involved in the whole process 
of setting up the optimal turnover level and determining how the fiscal instrument actually works.   
This paper proposes a simple model to interpret some strategic issues implicit in tax evasion. This 
phenomenon often involves a large number of individuals who mis-report a substantial portion of 
their income and who belong to one or more particular professions or types of firms. We assume 
that all income except for that of employees falls into these categories.  
The  simple  scheme  proposed  does  not  consider  the  limits  of  a  mechanism  for  auditing  or 
presumptive  income  instruments  such  as  the  Sector  Studies,  but  aims  to  analyze  the  strategic 
behaviour of those individuals involved in this mechanism.
 5 Indeed, while there is a substantial 
literature on auditing mechanisms, their strategic aspects have been less widely investigated.
6 This 
work aims to identify the various elements that affect the strategic behaviour of the taxpayer-tax 
dodger as an individual and as a collective body (professional category).  
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reports some stylized facts concerning the effects of 
the auditing mechanism in Italy. Section 3 presents the strategic model by referring to some simple 
concepts and theorems of game theory. Section 4 shows the complementarity effect of the fiscal 
mechanism  which  produces  an  inefficient  outcome.  Section  5  emphasizes  the  role  of  strategic 
complementarity  with  incomplete  information  and  Section  6  concludes,  making  some 
considerations on the implications of economic policy. 
 
2. Stylized facts 
 
To have an idea of the significance of the relationship between tax evasion and  Sector  Studies, we 
refer to the Revenue Agency data set. Table 1 points out that more than 80% of tax evasion is 
generated by the service sectors (trade and services to households and firms). These sectors are 
characterized  by  small  firms  which  are  most likely  to  evade  and  are  subject  to a  presumptive 
taxation  mechanism  (Sector  Studies):  in  Italy  about  96%  of  all  firms  employ  1-9  employees 
(4,379,107 of 4,581,545 firms), of which about 16% are individual firms.
7  
 
                                                
5 See, for instance, Arachi and Santoro (2007), Santoro (2007; 2008),  Marchese and Privileggi (2009), Convenevole et 
al. (2007) and the papers of the Revenue Agency’s Study Centre.  
6 See, for instance, the work on settlement models of Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (2004) and Franzoni (2004). 
Tax compliance as a coordination game among taxpayers has been investigated by Alm and McKee (2004). Some 
recent  papers on audit rules and strategic interactions among taxpayers are that of  Yim (2009) who propose a more 
cost-effective audit mechanism called “the bounded rule” on the basis of a strategic model between one auditor and 
multiple taxpayers, and Bayer and Cowell (2009) who examine the impact of a report-dependent audit rule (relative 
rule) on firms’ market decisions and compliance behavior. 
7 According to some members of the Revenue Agency, the most recent data indicate magnitudes not different from 
those reported in the table for 2002.   5 
 
 
Table 1. Tax evasion by macro-sector - 2002 
 
Sector 
Euro: million   Percentage composition 
Agriculture  9,233  4.56 
Industry    21,287  10.51 
Construction  8,153  4.03 
Commerce, hotels and public utilities  43,006  21.24 
Services for firms  74,586  36.84 
Services for households   46,219  22.83 
Total  202,484  100.00 
Source: Pisani and Polito (2006)     
  
 
The coordination success of the auditing mechanism is depicted (for 2006) by the plots in Figure 1. 
The  figure  reports  the  presumed  (theoretical)  turnover  levels  required  by  the  audit  mechanism 
(vertical axis) and the firms’ declared turnover (horizontal axis) for manufacturing (SD), services 
(SG) and intermediaries and retail stores (SM).  
 
Figure 1. Presumed and declared turnover. Manufacturing (SD), Services (SG), Intermediaries (SM) 
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The  correlation  coefficient  between  theoretical  and  declared  turnover  is  very  high:  98.9  for 
manufacturing firms, 97 for services firms and, finally, 99.5 for intermediaries and retail stores. 
This empirical evidence for Sector Studies 2006, supports two alternative points of view. First, the 
effectiveness of the auditing mechanism in inducing tax compliance, since the firms all converge to 
the presumed turnover. The alternative explanation is that the firms have manipulated the relevant 
variables  in  order  to  reach  their  presumed  turnover  levels.  This  last  interpretation  is  strongly 
supported by the committee report on Sector Studies, funded by the Ministry of Economics (2008), 
and by several other studies and documents from the Revenue Agency.
 8 
 
3. The Model 
 
3.1 Players   
The model is a simple scheme of strategic behaviour and involves two players, government and 
individuals, which in turn can be expressed as taxpayers (or conformers) (T) or evaders (E). In this 
work the ability of an individual to declare a lower income than that actually received is defined as 
avoidance. The government itself must decide whether to adopt a severe behaviour (S) with the 
planning controls and the imposition of penalties if the taxpayer has been discovered to be an 
evader,  or  weak  behaviour  (W),  limiting  expensive  audits  and  sanctions.
9  The  two  types  of 
government are viewed as the government’s ability to solve the tax evasion problem and handle the 
Revenue Agency efficiently. The type structure is described by the following government disutility 
function which embodies the assumptions on government efficiency and ability to cope with tax 
evasion.   
 
                                                
8 See, amongst others, Pisani (2004), Convenevole et al. (2007), and Santoro (2008). 
9 W=weak; S=strong; T=taxpayer; E=evader.   7 
3.2  Players’ payoffs 
 
The government. The government for managing the tax system and for detecting and fining tax 
evaders  undergoes  some costs. These depend, of course, on the efficiency of the Revenue Agency. 
The government’s objective is to minimize the following disutility function:  
 (1)                                   
m












where  0 / > C u δ δ  (disutility increases with C) and  1 > C  reflect the administrative and political 
costs for planning and managing the tax system and a network of controls. These costs determine 
the  efficiency  of  the  tax  system.  Since  Allingham  and  Sandmo  (1972),  one  of  the  crucial 
assumptions of tax evasion models is that the probability of evasion being detected is fixed and 
unrelated to any actions of individuals.
10 Here, ρ , the probability of being detected and fined, relies 
on ε  which represents compliance (number of individuals who comply) and m, the efficiency of the 
Revenue Agency. For instance, we can define as an indicator of efficiency the government funding 
to the Revenue Agency. Often these tax offices have a limited budget to operate with
11.  
As  regards  ρ ,  we  hypothesize  an  inverse  relationship  with  the  number  of  taxpayers  (ε )  and 
efficiency indicator of the Revenue Agency (m). Compliance  ε  ranges from 0 to 1. With  ε =1, 
0 = ρ , that is with full fiscal compliance, the problem of audits and fines disappears. Also the 
parameter (m) ranges from 0 and a positive number k>1: 0 indicates full efficiency of the Agency 
whereas high values of  k  indicate the greatest inefficiency. In this case the value of  ρ  is greatly 
reduced. In 2010, according to the Revenue Agency, the number of fiscal inspections on small firms 
and self-employed has been 220,000, whereas the number of total small firms and self-employed is 
about 5 million. These figures provide a rough estimation of the probability of being detected of 
0.045.
12    
Small values for (m), ceteris paribus, increase the probability of being detected but also rise costs 
(they imply greater financial support from the government). The cost of monitoring, however, may 
                                                
10 Exceptions are the optimal audit models. See, amongst others, Reinangum and Wilde (1985), Sanchez and Sobel 
(1993) and, more recently, Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (1997).  
11 These relationships are exogenously imposed, but they are crucial for strategic decisions. On the endogeneity of 
enforcement, see Chiarini, Di Domizio and Marzano (2009) . 
12 Busato and Chiarini (2004) calibrate the probability of being detected by estimating the unconditional mean of the 
ratio of number of inspected firms to their total number,  ) /( ) ( firms of number Total firms Inspected t = ρ  . 








03 . 0 / 1 * ρ ρ .  
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be partially or fully offset by the revenues generated from fining the tax evaders. In our model this 
is reflected in a value of ω  greater than 1. Depending on whether  1 > ω  (low efficiency) or  1 < ω  
(high efficiency), the cost function is decreasing or increasing in costs. 
The cost function is a constant elasticity function: with  1 < ω  the function 
ω − =
1 C C  is increasing in 
costs C whereas with  1 > ω  the function is decreasing. Parameterω  (efficiency of the tax system or 
reward parameter) should be related to the efficiency of the tax office m. For instance, the situation 
0 = ε   (massive  tax  evasion)  and  m=k  (minimum  efficiency)  entails  1 < ω ,  an  increasing  cost 
function, whereas m=0 provides a decreasing cost function with  1 > ω . These costs reflect the 
organizational and administrative problems and the costs of monitoring and sanctioning and those 
of actual collection of penalties, which the government faces in managing the tax system, and it 
seems natural to link them negatively to the efficiency of the Revenue Agency and the revenues 
generated from fining the tax evasion. 
Thus, a weak and accommodating government shows large values for (m), which implies inefficient 
audits and low costs, but with an increasing cost function  1 < ω .  Efficiency, of course, may be 
linked to the ability of the tax administration to coordinate and organize the institutional component 
involved  in  the  tax  evasion  problem  (finance  police,  tax  inspectors,  insurance  authorities, 
auditors,...). In the Italian case, and in particular for the Sector Studies, (m) can also be affected by 
the  degree  of  involvement  of  representatives  in  managing  the  tax  system:  m=k  indicates  full 
involvement (or minimum efficiency for the Agency).
13 
To summarize, we have,  
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Obviously, we are not specifically considering the budget constraint of the government because, as 
noted above, it is assumed that other taxpayers (employees) are not subject to choice and that the 
inefficiencies of the government and the evaders’ choice to hide income can be charged on the 
employees income to balance the budget.
 14 
                                                
13 Note that this interpretation of the Revenue Agency contributes to qualify the government’s type (W) and (S). In 
particular, a weak government is one that allows large involvement of the representative in the management and control 
of  the  auditing  mechanism.  In  the  short  run,  to  be  weak  for  a  government  means  reducing  the  political  and 
administrative costs. 
14 See Chiarini, Marzano and Schneider (2008) for the tax overburden in the last few decades in Italy. The overburden, 
which reflects an area of huge tax evasion, has, on average, been more than 11%, and has been maintained for decades. 
Its persistence implies the involvement of several governments and reflects a major failure and low credibility of the 
authorities in tackling evasion in Italy.   9 
 
Individuals. For a given level of public expenditure (for simplicity not considered) and assuming a 
tax system with two tax rates,  ) 1 , ( < > τ τ t t , the individual’s payoff (utility) is determined by the 
presumed turnover  s ˆ, his/her real (true) turnover s, and a function of set o relevant variables  ) (Ω f  
(inputs  used  in  the  activity,  stocks  and  inventories,  allocations,  variables  associated  with  sales 
proceeds, etc.) using the following relations:
15 
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Whenever individual i within professional sector j is able to achieve a turnover  level  ij i s s ˆ > , 
he/she may avoid being audited by manipulating Ω and therefore, setting  ij i s s ˆ = . Individuals with 
a real turnover greater than the theoretical,  ij i s s ˆ > , are prone to be coherent with the presumed 
turnover because their income y will be taxed at a lower rate, and a component of this income x will 
be completely hidden:  
 








Ω = Ω + − = + −
taxpayer honest t y
evader tax f f s s x x y
i
ij ij i ij i i
) 1 (




where  i y is the reported income of individual i. Certainly, the Sector Studies model is more complex 
and articulated.
16 Declaring the presumed (normal) turnover level is easy if one can manipulate the 
variables used to reckon the “reported” level. We assume that tax evaders are manipulating the 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
15 For individual we mean one of  the many homogeneous taxpayers. 
16 The Sector Studies is a mechanism of audit selection based on a complex statistical procedure. It signals firms (small 
firms and independent workers) reporting a low level of turnover with respect a benchmark (the turnover reported by 
firms with similar characteristics). This mechanism was introduced in 1988 and it is characterized by the following  
basic elements. The first one is the cluster (a subset of homogeneous firms). Data (number of employees, type of 
customers, accounting variables, dimensions of the premises, surface area of the offices etc.) are collected from firms 
with similar activity code and annual turnover under 5,164,569 euro. The second element is the principal component 
analysis for selecting the  most  important  variables  from  all  those  collected.  These  variables  are used  to  form  the 
clusters. Trough software (GERICO) provided by the Revenue Agency, each taxpayer may calculate his estimated gross 
turnover, according to the Sector Study pertaining to his activity.  The software also provides information on possible 
incoherence or irregularity in the data imputed by the taxpayer.  There may be two kind of audits. A firm may be 
audited if it reports a turnover lower than a theoretical (imputed) level. The second kind of audit is when the firm 
reports values of the relevant variables that are too far removed from those reported by the other firms in the cluster. 
See Arachi and Santoro (2007) and Marchese and Privileggi (2009). 
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relevant variables in order to hide a surplus x and gain a higher net tax income, since their income 
will be taxed at τ  instead of t.
17 These assumptions look sensible as they do not contradict the 
empirical data reported in Figure 1. To simplify the analysis and emphasizing the strategic aspects 
we assume the following cases (from now on we neglect the subscript):  
18  
 
1)  Assuming  y=1,  an  honest  taxpayer  (T)  is  coherent  (“congruo”)  with the  Sector  Studies 
mechanism when  ij i s s ˆ = . In this case, he/she receives with both government types (severe S 
and weak W) the payoff  ) 1 ( t − .  
2)  An evader (E) is characterized by  ij i s s ˆ >  but reports a turnover  equal to the presumed one. 
The payoff when a government is severe (S) is  ) 1 ( s t x ⋅ ⋅ −ρ  where x is the turnover gap 
) ˆ ( ij i s s − and  1 > ⋅ ⋅ s t ρ  stands for the penalty to be paid if discovered or audited.
 19 In that 
case the government takes back the entire surplus and also affects the income of the tax 
evader.  If the government is weak (W), the payoff is  ) 1 ( τ − + x  and the evader behaves as a 
taxpayer, paying a lower tax rate on a lower real income  ) 1 ( τ − y and pocketing the entire 
surplus x.   
 
The various possibilities are reported in the following payoff matrix:  
 
Figure 2    Government  
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The government’s payoffs are determined with m=k>1 for type W and m=0 for type S. We set  
0 = ε  for the case in which the individual is an evader.
20 With regard to the cost function 
ω − =
1 C C , 
                                                
17 We rule out statistical errors which can provide ij i s s ˆ ≠ . Moreover, we are assuming that the only problem with the 
Sector Studies mechanism is that it leaves individuals to manipulate the relevant variables.  
18  See  also  Santoro (2008).  Pisani  (2004) shows  how  firms  manipulate the  relevant  variables in  order to become 
coherent with the presumed revenue level. 
19 Obviously, the penalty should avoid solutions that lead to bankruptcy. 
20 Note, however, that we also may set  0 ≅ ε  (i.e. it is negligible) when a government faces a single individual as 
taxpayer without affecting the strategic result.    11 
we may assume that a single individual decision does not affect the government cost function, for 
which the government’s costs of planning and controlling the fiscal system can be approximated in 
all cases with  0 = ω .  
The  result  of  this  interaction,  with  complete  information,  is  trivial.  The  optimal  choice  of  the 
individual is to act as a taxpayer when a government is of type S, and to evade with a government 
W.  For the government, the choice W is a dominant strategy. This discretionary policy under full 
information  leads  to  a  unique  Nash  equilibrium  (E,  W).  The  government's  strategy  S  is  not  a 
credible threat as the strategy is strictly dominated by W. The simplicity of this strategic behaviour 
may  conceal  an  important  element:  the  government  of  type  W,  acting  against  the  individual, 
assumes that losses are of a second order, and as such, are not important, even if it is right that the 
revenue lost should be recovered in another game with other types of taxpayers. 
21 
Thus, the government has a dominant strategy since it is not worth the money to strengthen audit in 
order to catch one specific cheater. However, if there are many homogenous cheaters in the society, 
the choice of being a severe government may not necessarily be dominated. This is the object of the 
next two sections. 
 
4.  Many individuals (a category game) 
 
In Italy, the audit mechanism of the Sector Studies defines a situation with many similar private 
individuals in their work, entrepreneurship, opportunities and preferences. One of its main elements 
is the cluster to make sets  of firms  and individuals economically homogeneous. Thus  we may 
assume that in each cluster all individuals are identical in their preference and feasible actions, and 
play in a setting characterized by symmetric equilibria (all individuals choose the same action): all 
evaders E ˆ  or honest taxpayers T ˆ . 
 
-Individuals’ coordination mechanism 
The game is characterized by many similar agents and a government, and attention is restricted to 
symmetric  equilibria  ( T T E E ˆ ; ˆ = = ).  The  origin  of  strategic  coordination  of  individuals  is 
Schelling’s (1960) concept of a focal equilibrium, in which players in a game will have the highest 
payoffs  if  they  can  coordinate  on  a  strategy.  This  can  easily  occur  if  these  individuals  have 
information that leads them to focus on a particular strategy that will improve the likelihood of 
reaching the coordinated outcome.  
                                                                                                                                                            
 
21 Since the seminal work of Akerlof and Yellen (1985) the literature on near-rational behaviour has shown how one can 
generate much greater first-order effects.    12 
To envisage the simultaneous game that each agent plays with the others, we follow Van Huych, 
Battialo and Beil (1991), denoting   n a a ...... 1  as the actions taken by n individuals (odd) and M the 
median of these actions. The payoff function for each individual is defined as:  
 
(5)                                      0 , ) ( ) , (
2 > − − = β α β α i i a M M M a u  
In our case we restrict the strategy space of each agent to be an honest taxpayer or a tax evader 
{ } E T ai , ∈ .  The  individual’s  payoff  is  increasing  in  the  median  M  and  decreasing  in  the  gap 
between the single action  i a  and the median. This coordination problem, with complete information 
(payoffs and actions) and common knowledge, is trivial: if in the tax evasion game efficiency leads 
individuals to choose the action with the largest return, the efficient outcome is  n E E ...... 1 . Each 
element or pre-negotiated agreement which brings individuals to choose  n E E ...... 1  would be self-
enforcing.
22 If pregame information is not possible, to solve a non-trivial coordination problem, we 
may expect individuals to use the Nash equilibrium to inform their strategic behavior: 
 
 (6)                            *) , ( *) , (
* M a u M a u i i ≤  that is,   *) ˆ , ( *) ˆ , (
* E E u E T u i i ≤  
 
Consider, now, a setting in which each individual chooses to evade or pay taxes, taking as given the 
choice of all others belonging his/her category or professional class. This mechanism develops an 
incentive for the individual to align on one of the equilibria of the game.   
The utility for the evader becomes:   
 
 (7)                            0 / , 0 / , 0 / , 0 / ) , , , ( > ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ x u t u u u E t x u τ λ λ τ  
 
where E indicates the choice by the rational individual to evade. When the individual is an evader, 
his/her value increases by a factor  λ  due to the fact that other individuals belonging to the same 
class are evading. In other words, λ is the proportion of taxpayers in the same cluster who decide 
to evade. If these individuals act in a complementary way they increase the utility because one 
                                                
22 To prevent any misunderstandings, we leave out the strategic interactions among taxpayers. In this game we do not 
model how an individual has to form beliefs about others actions, and how he compares the expected payoff between 
comply and evade. In this case there might be multiple equilibria conditional on beliefs and the parameters of the game. 
We may use social norm as a substitute for others’ likelihood to evade and argue that it is the best interest for a taxpayer 
to evade if he thinks that the others are going to evade. We emphasize in this paper that with the Italian audit 
mechanism the possibility for the individual to converge to an equilibrium (comply or evade) is made easier, since the 
Studi di Settore provides him the information about the choice of all the others belonging to the same category or 
professional class.   13 
cannot judge (auditing, monitoring and sanctioning) a whole professional category, a whole class of 
job or a particular type of enterprise; there are positive spillovers due to the fact that the utility of an 
evader  increases  with  the  decisions  of  other  evaders.  This  is  the  crucial  aspect,  strategic 
complementarity,  which  is  the  basis  of  the  tax  evasion  phenomenon  and  it  is  related  to  the 
government’s discretionary policy. 
The advantage also emerges from the aggregation of taxpayers who comply: 
 
(7.1)                                    . 0 / , 0 / ) , ( < ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ t u u T t u ψ ψ                                         
 
For honest taxpayers the benefit is directly linked to the reduction in tax burden that is obtained if 
most (or all) taxpayers were to act as such, and can be thought of as tax deductions and/or tax 
allowances  or,  further,  as  a  reduction  in  the  tax  rate  for  the  category  involved.  Thus,  ψ  
( 1 = +ψ λ ) is the proportion of taxpayers in the same cluster who decide to be honest.
 23 These 
parameters  should  reflect  the  determinants  that  lead  to  aggregate  solutions  that  the  literature 
indicates specifically as strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity.
 24  
Now, the choice of the individual is simply to evade (E) if the aggregate of individuals belonging to 
his/her category choose to evade (E ˆ ), or be an honest taxpayer if this is the choice of the category 
(T ˆ).
25  Actions  of  individuals  are  strategic  complements:  being  an  honest  taxpayer  creates  an 
incentive for the remaining agents to act honestly. This strategic complementarity is central to the 
tax evasion and tax compliance of the coordination game, and provides positive spillovers in that 
the payoff of an individual increases as the action chosen by the others increases.  
 
-The government cost function 
The  coordination  game among  individuals  has  important effects  on  the  government’s  decision. 
When  a  single  individual  aligns  his/her  decision  with  those  of  fellow  colleagues  it  makes  a 
significant change in costs, since the probability of control and punishment changes due to the fact 
that a large component of individuals (possibly the whole category) evade or meet compliance. 
The behaviour (and costs) of the government, which is not affected by the decision of a single 
individual, is strongly influenced by the aggregate of evaders and taxpayers. In particular, for the 
cost function 
ω − =
1 C C  we have to keep in mind the assumptions described in (2):  1 > ω , if  ρ is 
high and m=0; and  1 < ω  for low values of ρ  and m=k>1. 
                                                
23 Obviously the tax rates   t , τ  provide disutility whereas   λ ψ,  entail utility to the individuals. 
24 See, for instance, Fehr and Tyran (2005) and the works quoted within the paper.  
25  E ˆ  and T ˆ denote the decision taken by all other individuals.   14 
In a setting with full compliance T ˆ ( 1 = ε ) the costs are reduced (recall equation 1) whereas in the 





Figure 3    Government  
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+ C  stands for an increasing cost function 
ω − =
1 C C  with   1 < ω , and  
− C  a decreasing cost 




Figure 4    Government  
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Figures 3 and 4 are defined by the following government characteristics:
26 
1)  For a strong and efficient (m=0) government, the full compliance costs decrease ( 1 > ω ) 
whereas the probability of auditing and fining tends to zero along with the rise in taxpayers: 
− − ⇒ + = C C C u ) 0 1 ( ) (
1 ω . 
                                                
26 Notice that caught evaders in Figure 3 still keep the utility λ . This is to testify that a whole professional category, a 
whole class of job or a particular type of enterprise are on trial.  
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2)  When the government S (m=0) is faced by extensive tax evasion, the probability of being 
detected (and its costs) tend to increase, although the cost function is decreasing ( 1 > ω ): 
) 2 ( ) 1 1 ( ) (
1 − − ⇒ + = C C C u
ω . 
3)  In the case of a weak and inefficient (m=k>1) government with full compliance ( 1 = ε ), the 
probability of being sanctioned  ρ  tends to zero but the inefficiency of the tax office does 
not allow a decreasing cost function,  C C u = ) ( . 
4)  When the government W (m=k>1) faces extensive tax evasion, C increases along with the 
cost of auditing and sanctioning . Here we assume that the parameter k is such as to generate 
the most reliable estimate for Italy (see footnote 12): 
  ) 03 . 1 ( ) 03 . 0 1 ( ) (
1 + − ⇒ + = C C C u
ω  
  
Figures 3 and 4 show the solutions of the strategic interaction between the aggregate of individuals 
and  the  government  with  two  Nash  equilibria  (T ˆ,  S)  and  (E ˆ ,  W).  The  first,  (T ˆ,  S),  is 
unambiguously Pareto-optimal from the welfare point of view, but the empirical evidence clearly 
shows that the equilibrium which characterizes the economy is (E ˆ , W): a problem of “coordination 
failure” leads individuals to converge on the suboptimal equilibrium (E ˆ , W).
27 Indeed, convergence 
to  this  equilibrium  is  determined  by  the  strictly  dominant  strategy  E ˆ   whenever  the  condition 
λ ψ + < x  holds.
 28  
 
5. A game with incomplete information 
 
To stress the importance of the complementarity effect (and the coordination mechanism) and the 
discretionary policy to reach the suboptimal equilibrium (E ˆ , W), we may reformulate the game in 
strategic  form  with  uncertainty,  highlighting  the  role  of  category  coordination.  Suppose  that 
individuals have private information: they may have two types which fully describe any information 
available which is not common knowledge. For our current purpose we will consider the game 
played  after  Nature’s  type  assignments  as  one  in  strategic  form.
29  The  individual  has  private 
information about the choice of all the others belonging to his/her category or professional class (T ˆ  
                                                
27 On the importance of strategic complementarities as a basis for macroeconomic coordination failure, see, amongst 
others, Cooper and John (1988) and King and Wolman (2004). 
28 If we relax the assumption on symmetric equilibria  0 = ε  and  1 = ε , and replace it with a fraction of individuals 
who act as taxpayers and a fraction who act as tax evaders, the analysis may be slightly altered but it still relies upon 
parameters ψ  and λ . 
29 We are considering a static game of incomplete information.   16 
or  E ˆ ). In other words, the individual knowsλ (and hence ψ ) and we hypothesize that his/her type 
space has two elements, denoted 
1 λ  ( 1 = λ and  0 = ψ ) and 
0 λ  ( 0 = λ and  1 = ψ ). A strategy for the 
government is, as before, just a single action (S, W). The payoffs are shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 
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While the individual knows his/her type, the government  places, say, equal probabilities on the two 
types. Obviously, this is only an assumption of convenience that will be removed below changing  
Nature’s type distribution:  the government has strong prior that there will be many tax evader ex-
ante. 
 The left uppermost cell states that if the government plays S and the individual has type 
0 λ  and 
plays E, they get   ) 2 (
− C  and  ) 1 ( s t x ⋅ ⋅ −ρ , respectively. The government’s payoff depends only on 
the  chosen  actions  and  not  on  who  the  individual  is.  We  can  easily  find  the  Bayesian-Nash 
equilibria of this game. Regardless of what the government does, 
0 λ  chooses T ˆ  and 
1 λ  chooses E ˆ . 
The government faces an opponent who may play T ˆ and E ˆ  with equal probability, because 
1 λ  and 
0 λ  are equally likely. Clearly, in this case, the government’s best response is S.
30 Thus, for this 
game the strategy set  { } 2 / 1 , ), ˆ , ˆ ( = p S E T  is a Bayesian equilibrium. Interestingly, when Nature’s 
type assignment favors 
1 λ , with a probability  0 → p  that the individual is type 
0 λ   (that is when 
0 = ψ ),  the  equilibrium  will  be  ( W E ˆ ).  On  the  contrary,  when  there  is  full  probability  of  the 
individual being type 
0 λ , (that is  1 = ψ ), the outcome is ( S T ˆ ).   
Notice that we do not want to emphasize that these equilibria are tied to the assumptions regarding 
the  structure  of  beliefs.  The  game  with  uncertainty  stresses  that  the  individual  has  private 
                                                
30  To be an optimal response for the government to play W, the following condition provided by the comparison of the 
expected disutility should hold:  )) 03 . 1 ( ) 2 ( ( ) (
+ − − − ≤ − C C C C .   17 
information about his type, but Nature may well coordinate this information. The only possibility 
for the individual to converge to an equilibrium is that he/she should have private information about 
the choice (T ˆ or  E ˆ ) of all the others belonging to the same category or professional class. Nature’s 
assignments are common knowledge. Individuals typically do not find it difficult to coordinate on 
the  tax  evasion  equilibrium  and  the  authority  is  unable  to  prevent  such  coordination  among  
individuals: the mechanism is based on turnover (not income) which may be easily manipulated, the 
turnover threshold ( j s ˆ ) and the set of relevant variables (Ω) are common knowledge and playing 
with  Gerico  (the  software  provided  by  the  Revenue  Agency  to  apply  the  Sector  Studies)  is 
straightforward. Thus the pre-game setting with the involvement of the representative in the game 
provides the elements for a mechanism that allows such coordination.   
 
The taxpayers’ lack of coordination 
The important issue is the lack of coordination of taxpayers. The advantage of complementarity 
parameter λ , which permits the coordination of tax evaders, is clearer and easier to appreciate with 
respect  to  the  complementarity  parameter  of  taxpayers  ψ .  This  difference  also  arises  in  other 
important aspects that concern the government: first of all, the lack of a clear and credible tax 
system  project.  Given  the  size  of  the  Italian  public  finance  disequilibria  (debt  and  deficits), 
outcomes due to a high parameter ψ  (essentially a reduction in tax rates on income) may not prove 
credible to individuals. Moreover, fiscal credibility is irrelevant if the coordination power of the 
Sector  Studies  mechanism  is  not  restricted  (e.g.,  to  limiting  or  hindering  the  representation  of 
categories involved in the construction and management of procedures; to including parameters to 
avoid manipulating procedures on the relevant variables etc.) or completely redefined. 
Also note that strategic complementarity inhibits a process of strategic substitutes for the individual: 
to go back on his/her decision and act honestly (as an individual taxpayer or enterprise), for instance 




Several  implications  of  this  simple  model  are  worth  mentioning.  First,  tax  evasion  may  have 
considerable  second-order  effects  in  terms  of  costs,  especially  if  there  is  some  coordination 
mechanism of individuals. Second, when a government is not able to commit to the  action S (a 
discretionary government), this necessarily leads to strategic complementarity of tax evaders. The 
discretionary approach on tax evasion should be reduced as much as possible: it creates the failure   18 
of honest taxpayers to meet compliance and increases the number of those who act as tax evaders. 
Third, strategic complementarity entails a coordination failure, where individuals converge to the 
least  efficient  equilibrium  from  a  social  perspective.  Finally,  in  Italy,  the  audit  mechanism  is 
envisaged  to  coordinate  individuals  to  be  tax  evaders.  Only  in  this  way  can  a  multitude  of 
individuals analyze parameters  λ ψ, . If we reflect upon the Sector Studies, the philosophy of the 
mechanism (the audit threshold, average parameters and the Gerico software used to manipulate the 
relevant variables) and the coordination institution, represented by category representatives along 
with tax advisers,
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